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A COMPARATIVE REVIEW ON COMPUTATIONAL MODELING 
PARADIGMS. A STUDY ON CASE-BASED MODELING 
AND POLITICAL TERRORISM 
 
CAMELIA FLORELA VOINEA 
 
 
 
We review the advances in Case-Based Computational Modeling on Political Analysis 
issues. Starting in early „70s, the research on political terrorism has been challenged by the latest 
advances of terrorism computational modeling research. Nowadays Political Analysis 
community has a wider perspective over the terrorism research aims, methodology and 
instruments. Widening up this perspective is not a matter of political analysis and research only, it 
is as well a long-term effect of an interdisciplinary style which has been adopted within the area 
by acknowledging the scientific advances and support of the Computational Modeling and 
Simulation as a specific scientific research method. Computational Modeling includes several 
research frameworks. The Case-Based Modeling is analysed and evaluated on a comparative basis 
with Agent-Based Modeling in a study on political terrorism phenomena. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Terrorism appears to nowadays Artificial Intelligence researchers as a 
collection of facts and information regarding situations and contexts which 
make the subject of political, military, economic and social concern almost all 
over the world, especially after September 11. In spite of the international 
efforts to control it, the political terrorism phenomena still represent an area of 
scarce conceptual and decision making experience which makes difficult the 
process of understanding, defining, and modeling it (Crenshaw, 2000; Cooper, 
2001), not to speak about the strong necessity of preventing and controlling it. 
Progresses have been made and reported ever since September 11, 2001, 
nevertheless terrorism is far from being completely understood and even less 
properly defined. Governments along with experts in Political Science, Social 
Sciences, Economic and Decision Sciences are currently focusing their research 
on finding the proper ways to approach this type of phenomena by means of 
interdisciplinary paradigms.  
After almost 30 years of research on political terrorism (Crenshaw, 2002), 
the Political Analysis community has a wider perspetive over the terrorism 
research aims, methodology and instruments. Widening up this perspective is 
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not a matter of political analysis and research only, it is as well an effect of an 
interdisciplinary style which has been adopted within PA area. It therefore  
acknowledges the scientific advances and support of the Computational Modeling 
and Simulation as a specific scientific investigation philosophy and method.  
 
Computational Modeling  
 
 
In spite of the extreme social, political, military and philosophical 
challenges raised by the terrorism phenomena, these challenges are rather 
driving us up to the idea that unusual as it is as a social phenomena, from a 
scientific research perspective it is at the same time a prototype of social 
change and a social emergence scenario. It therefore has to be approached as a 
new area of scientific interdisciplinary research for which new philosophical, 
cognitive, economic, military and social concepts and processes have to be 
defined. More than the social and political challenges terrorism has raised so 
far, terrorism is a scientific challenge itself. It either requiers a new science to 
be created and developed such that these phenomena could be approached and 
well-understood or it requires that several existing sciences employ their actual 
and potential resources in order to tackle the challenges of the terrorism  
phenomena.  
Beyond all the other questions connected to the issues above, terrorism 
has raised one more fundamental question: the question of the appropriateness 
of current scientific research instruments in defining terrorism. Computational 
Modeling is considered one of these sophisticated research instruments. 
However, its scientific status and its potential capacity to respond several 
fundamental epistemological questions in the area of scientific research, go 
beyond the status of an instrument and make of the computational modeling a 
best choice as a scientific research technology. From this perspective, it seems 
that terrorism opens up a research area for which we do not have so far the 
appropriate semantic primitives, the fundamental concepts, reasoning schema and 
knowledge representation: terrorism computational modeling and simulation. 
And it is this point that our approach has decided to start with: the role and 
substance of the computational modeling aimed at defining, describing, explaining 
and predicting terrorism phenomena in the area of Political Analysis. 
Nevertheless, in the area of Political Analysis, the terrorism issue as well 
as the issue of computational modeling of socio-political phenomena (terrorism 
included) are not at all new issues of research.  For more than 15 years, there 
have been systematically developed researches in several areas of mathematical 
and computational modeling which have focused on different aspects of 
terrorism and associated conflict, political violence, unconventional security 
affairs and war phenomena: the nature and patterns of terrorism, societal 
construction of terrorist ideology, organization and action, type of terrorist 
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weapons, strategies, decision-making and agents, to name but a few. The area 
of computational modeling and simulations on political analysis issues has 
become a virtual field of research able to offer the scholars a way of 
scientifically investigating the terrorism phenomena. There are several classes 
of terrorism concepts and phenomena which could be roughly identified with 
the following research approaches on computational models of terrorism: 
(1)  epistemological: definition, basic concepts and type of societal 
construction of terrorism; 
(2)  cultural: context of terrorism (ideology, religion, ethnicity) 
(3) instrumental: structure of terrorist organization, type of terrorist 
strategy, weapon and action, terrorist case databases; 
(4)  operational: military training games, strategic behavior, retaliation 
against terrorism, terrorist and guerilla warfare. 
Following this classification, several types of computational approaches 
may be identified: 
– mathematical and computational models of decision making in 
terrorist organizations and agents based on Decision Theory, Markov Decision 
Processes and repeated Bayesian Games (Weaver et al., 2001); 
– mathematical models based on the Graph Theory of the structure, 
organisation and action of the terrorist cells (Peterson, 2004; Farley, 2003); 
– emotion models in the development of computational models and 
agent-based simulations of terrorist behavior and terrorist decision making 
organizations and agents in the area of military training games (Johns and 
Silverman, 2001); 
– case-based models and databases of terrorist operations, organizations, 
types of weapons, types of security, ideology and agents (Dupuy, 1988); 
– agent-based computational models of the relation between ethnicity 
and conflict (Cederman, 2005), of the geo-cultural logic of nationalist insurgency 
and civil wars (Cederman, 2004), of the pacifying effect of peace-keeping 
forces on secession and ethnic inter-group conflicts (Epstein, Steinbruner and 
Parker, 2001), of the ethnic genocide in Rwanda (Bhavnani and Backer, 2000) 
and of the globalisation and the ethnic conflict (Van der Veen, 2001). 
Though some of the above-mentioned computational models succeed to 
provide for explanations of nationalist insurgency in terms of geopolitical and 
geocultural contexts using the theory of complex adaptive systems (Cederman, 
2005), there is no computational model or there are only scarce research 
resources employed so far which could provide a basis for an explanation of the 
emergence of terrorism (Cerderman, 2001), for defining terrorism or for the 
development of a conceptual model able to explain the roots of terrorism as a 
philosophy of action and choice.  
Each of these classes of computational modeling approaches has focused 
on some particular aspect of terrorism and some of these models succeeded to 
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offer a comprehensive perspective over these phenomena. The advantages of 
these models reside in their capacity to “mimick” the reality and provide for a 
chance to investigate these phenomena in artificial worlds/societies.  
We will approach in this paper on a comparative basis a conceptual 
modeling framework which succeeds to bring a Cognitive Science paradigm – 
modeling – and an Artificial Intelligence paradigm – Concept Learning – back 
to our memory and in the service of Computational Modeling and Simulation in 
Political Analysis: the Case-Based Reasoning paradigm. 
Case-Based Reasoning (or simply CBR) is a classical reasoning 
paradigm used in the area of problem solving. It is based on analogy, reminding 
and the use of explanative past experience in order to solve new problems. So 
far so good. There is nothing special so far in CBR with regard to the 
computational modeling issue in Political Science we have introduced above, 
not to say that CBR is regarded as already an old-fashioned Artificial 
Intelligence paradigm created by late „70s and forgotten soon after its first 
performances in the area of Expert Systems. There is however a clue to an 
argument which makes it suddenly valuable again: CBR works with ill-structured 
domain theories and it has been the only paradigm of the Artificial Intelligence 
which has acknowledged the term of creative hypothesis development by means of 
adaptive explanations – the terminology belongs to Alex Kass (Kass, 1990) – 
provided by the past experience, understanding and remembering. The 
connection between these intriguing attributes and the issue of conceptual 
constructivism in Political Science might now appear straightforward: CBR 
paradigm provides a framework for using the past experience for conceptual 
construction in ill-structured domains. The limitations of ill-structured domain 
theories underlying systems building on past experience weaken the 
explanation structure and expressiveness. Therefore the explanative power of 
such conceptual constructs is strongly dependent on the knowledge 
representation, reasoning and learning strategy.  
The aim of reaching a powerful explanation framework by cognitive 
modeling might look limited itself given the technical limitations invoked 
above, but it still is the aim we go for. The reason is that the complexity of 
phenomena might be approached from two perspectives: (a) we can either 
explain things by growing up a simulation model whose outcomes could imitate 
in a “believable” way the real processes (Epstein, 1999), or (b) we can explain 
things by having well-structured domain knowledge, which we can get by 
learning and conceptual construction.  
One might argue that the explanation power heavily depends on the 
completeness and soundness of the knowledge in the domain theory, and having 
to deal with ill-structured domains, the aim of a powerful explanation 
framework might never be reached. There is no complete and sound knowledge 
in either of these alternate perspectives – simulation model or explanative 
conceptual knowledge. There is nevertheless an undoubtedly complementarity 
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between the two: one can grow up a simulation model knowing as much as 
possible about the underlying reality or one can construct a corpus of conceptual 
knowledge which can make the simulations be understood in real terms. 
 
Case-Based Reasoning 
 
The classical AI Case-Based Reasoning approach has been introduced by 
Roger Schank in 1982 (Schank, 1982). At that time, CBR was meant to be a 
unifying paradigm for knowledge representation and concept learning, and for 
almost a decade it focused everybody‟s attention, being rapidly developed and 
scaled up to more complex capabilities like the problem solving. Nevertheless it 
has been forgotten soon afterwards. Why ? 
The answer concerns the very essence of the CBR paradigm, which suits 
very well the requirements of a conceptual model able to start from ill-structured 
domain theories, and to further build up expertise by interleaving learning and 
reasoning into an integrated framework of different past experiences.  
One main advantage of CBR-type computational modeling is its capacity 
of conceptual construction from contingent knowledge. The Knowledge Base of a 
CBR-based systems is able to grow up as a corpus of domain knowledge by means 
of learning. Such a system is able to abstractize from contingent data by means 
of inductive (example-based generalizations), deductive (explanation-based learning) 
or abductive (by the use of plausible reasoning) learning techniques. Past 
experience is used as a resource for building up abstract conceptual constructs: 
once conceptual construction enriched with new concept, the system‟s 
cognitive competence increses influecing its cognitive modeling performances. 
As new cases are encountered, they are easily classified. The other major 
advantage of CBR-based systems is the problem solving capacity: past 
experience is used to extract explanations or solutions of known cases and to 
solve new problems. The analogy-based transfer of problem solving 
competence from the past cases to new cases make of CBR a paradigm for the 
understanding models and for the development of creative hypothesis by 
adaptive explanations. 
The initial limitations of the classical CBR paradigm have been induced – on 
the one hand – by the computer memory and programming technical limitations 
and – on the other hand – by the limited representation power of the knowledge 
representation structures like the scripts and frames used at that time. Once these do 
not operate anymore as technical limitations cutting down the CBR theoretical 
capabilities, CBR could become the appropriate paradigm to approach 
conceptual constructisvism in Political Science, due to its considerable 
conceptual representation, learning and explaining power. The considerable 
enhancement provided by the Internet technologies and associated intelligent 
technologies, like the KDD (see Section 4), are now available and most 
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appropriate to replace the classical in CBR dynamical memory with advanced 
memory access techniques. 
 
2. Early and OnGoing Research Work in Case-Based Reasoning  
 
We have traced back the case-based modeling paradigm along a period of 
time of 30 years, since Roger Schank had first reported research results on the 
Scripts‟ Theory and on a new theory of case-based knowledge representation 
and learning. We have classified research work in three stages: (1) the pioneering 
work of Schank and the classical CBR systems of early and mid‟ 80‟s; (2) the 
CBR inspired research work developed within the area of Knowledge and Data 
Discovery; (3) the case-based modeling research work developed within the 
area of Agent-Based Modeling in social and political sciences. 
The way Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) came into being as a distinct AI 
problem solving and learning paradigm is connected – on the one hand – to the 
theories of computability and symbolic representation in computers (Simon and 
Newell, 1972) and – on the other hand – to the cognitive science theories on 
expert problem solving by analogy (Gentner, 1983; Carbonnell, 1983; 
Carbonnell and Lenat, 1986). 
In the twentieth century, by the mid 70‟s, several research communities 
reported research results concerning an interesting transfer of philosophy and 
cognitive psychology models of human mind and human associational learning 
towards the theory of computability and the area of Artificial Intelligence and 
Machine Learning sciences. All this has represented the starting point for the 
development of the theories concerning the knowledge representations in 
humans and machines (Dreyfus, 1986). The “conceptual engine” which proved 
able to move on the philosophy of the human mind and cognition towards the 
computing machinery was the idea that we can draw a parallel between the 
human mind and the computing machine at the level of the modeling capacity. 
Philippe N. Johnson-Laird, in his seminal work on Mental Models. Towards a 
Cognitive Science of Language, Inference, and Consciousness (1983), had 
proved out that symbolic representations in the computer memory refer to the 
world inasmuch human perception “is the construction of the world” (Johnson-Laird, 
1983, p.156). As humans “are unable to compare this perceptual representation 
directly with the world” since “it is their world” (Johnson-Laird, 1983, p.156), and 
use references to their mental models to make this comparison, so does the computers: 
“The programmer can solve problems in terms of arrays and can entirely ignore 
the detailed machinery on which they rely. There is no reason to suppose that 
the human mind is organized on different lines. It, too, needs to develop new 
procedures and it can do so very much more easily if it can work directly with 
high-level structures, such as spatial representations, ignoring the details of 
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their ultimate representation in the brain” (Johnson-Laird, 1983, p.153-154). 
John R. Anderson, in his early work on Arguments concerning representations 
for mental imagery (1978) and further developed in his book on Cognitive psychology 
and its implications (1985) proves the idea that mental representations of the 
perceived world or imagery can be mimicked (the Mimicry Theorem) by 
different kind of representations and constructs which are able to behave in an 
equivalent way. This basic idea has turned later on to be useful as a background 
to the transferring of Cognitive Psychology theories concerning the associational 
character of the human expert problem solving into a theory of knowledge 
representation and modeling of contingency experiences in computers.  
On the other hand, studies of expert problem solving by analogy showed 
that human experts make oftenly use of their past experience in problem 
solving to adapt the solutions to previoulsy encountered problems to currently 
encountered problems which prove to be equivalent or just similar to the old 
problems encountered in the past by means of analogy-based schemata transfer 
(Gentner, 1983).  
Roger Schank associated these theories with the evidence that computers 
may store a huge amount of problem solving experiences (cases) and could 
therefore be used as an artificial intelligent expert systems in problem solving. 
The problem of making the computer do the same as the human experts was not 
so much a problem of model building in an artificial environment like the 
computer‟s memory (a problem already studied and solved by excellence by 
Simon and Newell in their book in 1972), but a problem of building a past 
experience storage which could be accessed and inspected in a dynamic manner 
as it apparently happens with the human experts‟s memory in such situations. 
After a long time when computers‟ artificial intelligence have been designed to 
learn in many possible ways – from domain or model theories, from examples 
and counterexamples, or by means of heuristic rules and production systems – 
Schank himself combined the theories previously developed with his new 
theory on machine learning: learning from the solutions provided by the past 
experiences stored and retrieved in a dynamically accessed memory of 
previously solved problems (or past “cases”). 
Schank had been the pioneer of the Case-Based Problem Solving and 
Learning Theory (also known as the Schank‟s MOP Theory of human problem 
solving and learning). He theoretized and actually developed together with his 
students at the Yale University several AI systems based on the storage of 
conceptual and factual knowledge from past experiences (or past cases) in a 
case memory from which both knowledge and reasoning schemata can be 
retrieved and further used for problem solving and concept learning purposes: 
CYRUS (Kolodner, 1983), JULIA (Kolodner, 1993; Hinrichs, 1992), CHEF 
(Hammond, 1986). Their example and research experience has been further 
developed in the following years: the CASEY system developed at the M.I.T. 
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(Koton, 1989), the PROTOS system developed at the University of Texas, Austin 
(Porter and Bareiss, 1986), the CREEK system developed at the University of 
Trondheim and the Norwegian Institute of Technology (Aamodt, 1991), the XP 
adaptive explanation system developed at the Institute for the Learning 
Sciences and Northwestern University (Kaas, 1991) and the SEA system 
developed at the Romanian Research Institute for Informatics (Voinea, 1991a). 
Schank‟s original work concerned a particular type of schema-based theories, 
called the Script Theory (Schank, 1977; Minsky, 1975), which concentrate an 
explanation extracted from a past case in a stereotype knowledge structure 
which can be instantiated to explain new cases. Scripts and frames provided the 
appropriate knowledge structures to implement Schank‟ Scripts Theory. The 
Case Memory is organized as a hierarchy network in which the nodes contain 
generalized knowledge structures called Generalized Episodes (GE) or 
Episodic-Memory Organization Packets (E-MOPs). Each GE is a knowledge 
structure which generalises the episodes sharing similar properties like norms. 
The GEs are discriminated by means of their associated indices (name and 
values). The instances of GEs are stored as individual cases. The GEs are used 
as an indexing structure for matching and retrieval of cases. A particular case is 
retrieved by matching its features against the GEs: the best match identifies the 
GE with most features in common with the matching case (Schank, 1982). 
CHEF is a planning system which combines model-based reasoning and 
explanation-based learning. The cases are goal-oriented plans stored in a planning 
memory where the best match provides the plan which best suits the achievement of 
a certain pre-defined goal. The system uses a causal knowledge model to adapt 
plans from the planning memory to the current goal (Hammond, 1986). 
CASEY is a system of causal reasoning which combines two types of 
reasoning – associational (case-based) and interpretative (model-based) – with 
a causal knowledge model. The Case Memory consists of cases stored together 
with a causal explanation. The problem solving task is achieved by matching a 
current case against the Case Memory and extract a causal explanation which is 
used for classification. The learning task consists in storing the cases and their 
associated causal explanations in the Case Memory (Koton, 1989). 
PROTOS is designed as a case-based system aimed at classification and 
concept learning from a collection of examples (instance cases). A current case 
is described as a set of attributes which are used to identify in the case memory 
the case which best matches the current case. The examples (instances) are 
stored as the nodes in a semantic network of domain knowledge and the 
connections between the nodes describe the taxonomy relations. A new concept 
is learned by generalisations of the instances with the same attributes. The 
problem solving task is achieved by analogy-based solution transfer from the “best 
match” case in the case memory to the current case (Porter, 1986; Bareiss, 1988). 
CREEK (Case-based Reasoning through Extensive Explicit Knowledge) 
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is a knowledge intensive approach to problem solving and learning which 
combines several paradigms of reasoning and learning in an unifying view. It 
uses a knowledge base which contains both general and specific domain 
knowledge, allowing for using model-based, rule-based, case-based and 
experienced-based reasoning and learning (Aamodt, 1991). 
SEA (Semantics and Explanations vs. Ambiguity) is a CBR system 
(Voinea, 1991a) which addreses the problem of hypothesis choice from among 
a set of explanatory hypotheses by integrating both explanatory and semantic 
principles of coherence. The hypotheses choice operates on a combined model-based 
and case-based reasoning schema in empirical or abduction-based learning. The 
explanatory hypotheses extracted from some domain theory or from the past 
experience which prove to form a coherent hypotheses set are further used in 
problem solving tasks of new cases (Voinea, 1991b). 
The Adaptation-Based Theory of Explanation – the XP system (Kaas, 
1991) is an extension of the schema-based theory, in particular of the 
Script/Frame Theory, to story understanding by developing creative 
hypotheses. While the Schank‟ script theory applied stereotype schema 
extracted from the Case Memory as general knowledge structure called MOPs 
to the new cases problem solving tasks, the Kaas‟ approach is an extension of 
the script theory to the problems solving of new cases to which a stereotype 
schema extracted from the Case Memory does not apply: such atypical cases 
need that the solution schema gets adapted by means of causal reasoning 
models.  Instead of stereotype knowledge structures like MOPs, the adaptation-
based explaining system uses XPs (Explanation Patterns) which explicitly 
encode causal reasoning and causal coherence mechanisms able to explain the 
schema and adapt it to fit new problem solving instances. The Case Memory is 
replaced with an Explanation Patterns Memory which can provide causal 
explanations of the solution‟structure needed by a new case. The organizing 
principle is not centered anymore on matching and retrieval mechanisms and on 
the temporal sequencing of the events describing a case (MOPs), but on 
inference chains and explicit representation of the causal relationship between 
the elements of a solution structure (XPs). The steps in developing an 
explanation are: XP retrieval, extraction from the XP Memory and application 
to the new case at hand. If the retrieved XP successfully explains the case at 
hand, the explanation process is reduced to a script application. Otherwise, if 
the retrieved XP fails matching the new case due to its incompleteness, 
inconsistancies, invalid assumptions or wrong type of knowledge with respect 
to the new case, the explanation (XP) is adapted in a creative way by producing 
a new variation on the retrieved XP. After creating an acceptable explanation, 
the adapted XP is stored in the XP Memory. The adaptation strategies involved 
in producing variations of the retrieved XPs by replacing the components of the 
explanations (i.e., the development of the creative hypotheses) include: 
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replacing an inappropriate action/agent, generalising a constraint, refining a 
slot-filler description, adding a sub-explanation.  
The limitations of CBR as a problem solving and learning paradigm 
come from external constraints: one regards the memory support and indexing 
system and the other one regards the representation memory structures. Neither 
of these have had the proper charateristics for a really dynamically evolving 
memory structures, as it has been proved later on as new memory concepts and 
principles  have been developed
1
. 
Regardless of its limitations, the fundamental characteristics of the 
classical CBR which made it a valuable theoretical experience concern two 
main aspects: (i) the use of the conceptual knowledge models and 
generalisation techniques for the case-based concept learning, (ii) and the use 
of explanation as a means of mapping the solutions to past problem solving 
experiences onto newly encountered problem solving cases. These 
characteristics represent in a nutshell the most precious idea which CBR 
brought to the light: model semantics and explanation power as the means of 
knowledge extraction from contingent cognitive experience.  
 
 
3. Classical CBR Modeling Paradigm  
 
The Case-Based Reasoning Model 
 
The general structure of the CBR Models consists of a Cognitive Model 
underlining the Knowledge Model, a Case Memory associated with a set of 
case indexing techniques, and a collection of cases. The Knowledge Model 
consists of the general domain knowledge describing the conceptual 
knowledge, and the domain specific knowledge describing the experiential 
knowledge level. It also includes control knowledge, rules, inferencial engines. 
 
The Case-Based Reasoning Process 
 
The general CBR process can be described as a four step process 
(Schank, 1983; Kolodner, 1983; Hammond, 1986; Porter and Bareiss, 1986; 
Kaas, 1990; Aamodt, 1991):  
                                                          
1
  See WALTER FREEMAN‟s Societies of Brains (1995), ROGER PENROSE‟s The 
Emperor’s New Mind (1989), HUMBERTO R. MATURANA and FRANCISCO VARELA‟s 
Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realisation of the Living (1980), the RICHARD DAWKINS‟ 
Selfish Gene (1989), DANIEL DENNETT‟ Consciousness Explained (1991) and JOHN 
BROCKMAN‟s Third Culture (1995)  for an extended history of Computer Science and Artificial 
Intelligence Science. 
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The first step may be described as the “comprehension step”, since it 
concerns the identification of the current case with its relevant characteristics, 
which can be immediately matched against similar characteristics of the cases 
already recorded in the Case Memory (see Figure 3.1.); 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Classical CBR Process. The Comprehension Stage 
 
The second step may be described as the “solution transfer”, since it concerns 
the analogy-based transfer of the solution extracted from the best match case 
found in the Case Memory to the current case; the solution extracted from the Case 
Memory may be adapted in order to make it fit the particularities of the current case; 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Classical CBR Process. The Solution Transfer Stage 
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The third step may be described as the “solution acknowledgement”, 
since it concerns the evaluation of the way the transferred solution performs as 
the solution of the current case and the quality of the results; this two steps 
could be iterated until the imported solution is completely adapted to the current case; 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Classical CBR Process. The Solution Acknowledgement Stage 
 
The forth step may be described as the “learning” step, since it concerns 
the storage of the current case together with its solution in the Case Memory. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Classical CBR Process. The Learning Stage 
 
The Knowledge Representation Framework 
 
The knowledge representation issue is of a particular relevance for the 
CBR paradigm since it represents one of the three dimensions of cognitive and 
problem solving performances of the CBR systems: (a) the expertise model, (b) 
the reasoning model, and (c) the learning model. Depending on the approach on 
12 
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each of these research fundamental dimensions, a CBR system may prove 
capacity to understand past experience, to extract from it the relevant 
knowledge necessary to solve newly appeared problem solving tasks, and, 
finally, to update and enrich its knowledge and problem solving experience by 
learning from each new experience. The development of researches on CBR 
paradigms has overlapped in time with researches on knowledge acquisition 
and representation models like the Schank‟s scripts/frame dynamic memory 
model, frames (Winograd, 1975), semantic networks (Brachman, 1979, 1983; 
Brachman and Levesque, 1985), Wilensky (1986), KADS (Breuker and 
Wielinga, 1989) and expert systems (Waterman, Hayes-Roth and Lenat, 1983) 
(and others, but an analysis of this area does not make the subject of this 
paper). Classical CBR systems usually embedd integrated representational 
frameworks for knowledge modeling, problem solving and learning, oftenly 
combining multiple reasoning models: model-based, rule – or constraint-based, 
case-based, and causal or explanation-based understanding and reasoning 
models.  
The classical CBR systems have powerful descriptive and reasoning 
capacities based on: 
(1)  the knowledge model, including the expertise model and the 
representational model,  
(2)  the inferencial power of the (oftenly, combined) reasoning models 
and their impact on the problem solving processes, 
(3)  the generalisation power of the learning model.  
 
The Knowledge Model 
 
A typical CBR Knowledge Representation Model is based on the modeler‟s 
cognitive model of the world and consists of two fundamental levels (Minsky, 
1975, 1988; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Jansson, 1986; Kaas, 1990; Aamodt, 1991):  
(1
st
 level) the Conceptual Level, i.e. the modeling level of the (modeler‟s 
perception of the) real world; at this level, the set of semantic primitives are 
used to construct a real world model (the ontology level),  
(2
nd
 level) the Representational Level, i.e. the level consisting of the 
representational constructs; at this level, a set of representational primitives are 
used to construct a semantical correspondence between the objects of the two 
levels, i.e., to map the artificial (computational) world objects on the 
representational level to the corresponding objects on the conceptual level (the 
epistemology level) (Brachman, 1979).  
The cognitive performances of a knowledge representation frameworks 
and, implicitly, of any CBR system relying on such representational platforms 
reside in the capacity of such knowledge models to construct an operational 
correspondence between the set of the semantic primitives describing the real 
13 
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world (examples of semantic primitives: time, space) and the set of the 
representational primitives (examples of representational primitives: symbol, 
entity, value, relation) 
In other research approaches, a knowledge representation model consists 
of more representational levels, each modeling level corresponding to a 
different layer of representational primitives and constructs (Breuker and 
Wielinga, 1986, 1989; Newell, 1982, 1990; ). 
The major part of the CBR research is mainly based on a class of 
knowledge models which use the taxonomic representation. Representation of 
taxonomies is based on the generalisation-specialisation hierarchies. Such 
hierarchies use two types of taxonomic relationships: (i) relationships between 
intensionally described concepts and instances (generalisation-of / specialisation-of), 
and (ii) relationships between extensionally described concepts and instances 
(element-of/subset-of). 
The structure and contents of the Knowledge Representation Model 
concern the knowledge types, the representational terms and the knowledge 
representations for the domain theory, cases, and explanation structures.  
The Knowledge Types are categories of representational knowledge and 
are used to describe the representational constructs. The CBR systems work 
with several knowledge types:  
(1) types concerning the meaning of knowledge, like level, depth, role 
and (degree of) generality: the role type concerns the descriptive and 
operational knowledge, the (degree of) generality type concerns the general 
knowledge (domain theory knowledge) and specific knowledge (instances, 
exemplars, cases, plans, rules and constraints), the level type concerns the 
object level (descriptive) and control level (procedural) knowledge, and the 
depth type concerns the deep knowledge models (domain theory, rules) and 
shallow knowledge models (cases, observations) .  
(2) types concerning the form of knowledge, like concepual, procedural, 
and control knowledge. 
The Representation Terms concern the set of representational primitives 
and the representational constructs. These terms include general domain knowledge 
structures like scripts, frames, semantic networks, indexing structures like 
names, remindings and difference links, case representation structures like 
MOPs (CASEY), TOPs (CHEF), exemplars (PROTOS, SEA), plans (JULIA), 
experiences and explanations (XP). 
 
The Reasoning Model 
 
The artificial intelligent systems developed under the CBR paradigm are 
generally aimed at problem solving. The specific past experiences stored as 
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associational (index, case, solution) knowledge structures are usually inspected 
(matched against the current case) in order to find similarities with the problem 
solving task at hand and, if such a case similarity is found in the Case Memory, 
the respective case-solution is extracted, adapted (if necessary), and applied to 
the current case. This general problem solving framework has three phases: 
“understanding the problem” – “generating the plausible solutions” – “selecting 
a good solution” (Newell and Simon, 1972; Aamodt, 1991).  
The “understanding” phase is strongly dependent on the cognitive model 
(Schank, 1982; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Minsky, 1988; Newell, 1990) underlying 
the knowledge representation, reasoning and learning framework used by a 
CBR system. It is important because it is the phase which provide the candidate 
solutions that can potentially be applied to the problem solving tasks of a new 
case. The description of the problem at hand is interpreted on the basis of the 
general domain knowledge and/or experience knowledge structures and 
reasoning mechanisms characterizing this cognitive model. The problem‟s 
attribute description is matched against the case descriptions in the Case 
Memory. The matching process is aimed at identifying the similarities and/or 
differences between the current description and the other descriptions existing 
for other cases stored in the Case Memory. The understanding model and the 
case matching process in a CBR system are of a particular releveance for the 
CBR philosophy: they provide for a knowledge selection process which 
undergoes the explanation construction. This explanation is necessary if the 
retrieved candidate solutions should be reduced in order to get the most 
appropriate candidate solution (best match) for the problem solving task at 
hand. The term  “explanation” has the meaning of “justification” and concerns 
both a body of knowledge extracted from the case base by means of search, 
retrieval and matching, and an inferential process aimed at proving the 
coherence of the extracted knowledge with the current case attribute description 
and problem solving tasks.  
There is a significant difference between the Understanding Models and 
the Reasoning Models: while the reasoning models are used to extract solutions 
and apply them to new problem solving, the understanding models are used to 
extract causal relationships between knowledge items and buildup explanations. 
There are three schools of thought: first, the so-called “retrieve and 
apply” school of explanation construction (Minsky, 1975; Schank and Abelson, 
1977), which views the whole process as a memory-driven retrieval and 
application process of the knowledge schema in the case memory to any 
equivalent or, at least, similar new case. The second, the “plausible inferences 
chaining” school of thought (Rieger, 1975; Wilensky, 1978) views the 
explanation construction as an inference process which uses a large plausible 
inference rules base to build up a solution for any new case. Finally, the 
“creative hypothesis” school of explanation construction (Kaas, 1990) which 
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has been considered as a revolutionary approach to the CBR paradigm. This school of 
thought assumes that new cases are rarely equivalent or similar enough to past cases 
such that a knowledge schema could be applied for successful problem solving purposes. 
While previous approaches put the burden on the memory use making the explanation 
construction to appear as a process of indexing and retrieval of knowledge 
schema from a memory of past experiences, this approach highlighted the role 
of the reasoning models. It views the explanation construction as a process of 
explanation adaptation based on the development of creative hypotheses for the 
situations in which the extracted knowledge from the case base is either 
irrelevant, or not appropriate enough for the problem solving tasks.  
It is this approach which seems of major relevance to our research 
purposes, since understanding terrorism is oftenly a situation of either lack of 
past experience or scarce past experience, both perspectives being in no way 
sufficient to find knowledge schema and solutions for any new terrorism case. 
The reasoning model is one of the components of a general problem 
solving process and its role concerns the projection of the goal constraints onto 
the inference chain in the problem solving context specified by the particular 
problem at hand. The result of this projection is what we call in the 
computational environment an explanation, i.e. a computational justification of 
the reasoning process outcomes. The reasoning model is characterized by the 
reasoning type (model-based reasoning, rule-based reasoning, case-based 
reasoning, explanation-based reasoning, constraint-based reasoning, causal 
reasoning, common-sense reasoning, etc.) and by the inference methods.  
A typical case-based reasoning process can be described itself as a 
multi-phase process depending on the school of thought its general problem 
solving model belongs to:  
(1) for the retrieve and apply knowledge schema type of framework, the 
reasoning process may be described as a sequence of two steps:  
1
st
 step:  “coherence-based extraction of the knowledge schema”  
2
nd
 step:   “application of the extracted knowledge schema to the 
current case”;  
(2) for the plausible inference chaining type of framework, the 
reasoning process may be described as a bottom-up process which uses a large 
base of plausible inference rules to build up explanations by dynamically 
chaining these inference rules together each time a new case needs a solution:  
1
st
 step:  “use the input case description to follow up any plausible 
inference rule which apply to the input case”  
2
nd
 step:   “inference chaining”  
3
rd
 step:   “focus on a solution” 
Aamodt describes this process as a sequence of three reasoning steps:  
“activating knowledge structures” – “explaining candidate facts” – “focusing 
on a conclusion” (Aamodt, 1991; Aamodt and Plaza, 1994). The “activating” 
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phase concerns the retrieval of knowledge schemata extracted from the similar 
cases in the Case Memory: the indexing structures are instantiated with the 
relevant attributes of the current case so that they can be used for the searching, 
identification and extraction of the cases having similar attribute descriptions 
with the current case. The retrieved cases are used as a potential knowledge 
and/or solution source for the current case. To this aim, these candidate cases 
are matched against the current case so that a best match case can be found. 
This selection process can be interpreted as an explanation process since the 
match-based selection methods are actually inference methods able to justify 
the selection or rejection of a candidate case: they check if the extracted knowledge 
is coherent with the current case knowledge description. Finally, the solution of the 
best match case is applied and/or adapted for the current case problem solving 
task. 
The type of reasoning used in the classical CBR is highly dependent on 
the case representation and retrieval, but the most important characteristics 
which makes the difference between CBR and other reasoning models is the 
adaptation of a retrieved solution to a new problem solving context. From this 
point of view, the case-based reasoning model includes several theories from 
philosophy and cognitive psychology which regard the use of general 
background knowledge in order to derive a model of the world or to derive a 
solution to a problem solving task. It must be emphasized however that the 
case-based reasoning model has many similarities with other reasoning paradigms, 
like exemplar-based reasoning, memory-based reasoning or analogy-based 
reasoning. The main similarity with the exemplar-based reasoning model is the 
learning of new abstract concepts using extensional descriptions of concepts: in this 
type of scenario, a CBR task is mainly a classification task in which the class of the 
most similar (best match) past case retrieved in the Case Base becomes the class 
of the solution to a current classification problem. The main similarity with the 
memory-based reasoning is the use of a case memory and the definition of the case-
based reasoning process in terms of searching and retrieving a particular case in the 
case memory using memory indexing techniques (Schank, 1982) or general domain 
knowledge (Kolodner, 1983). The main similarity with the analogy-based 
reasoning is that both models use methods to solve new problems by means of 
solutions to past similar problems. Here, the major difference is that analogy-
based reasoning use past cases from a different domain (called “source” or 
“base”) to solve current problem (called “Target”), while the CBR uses past 
cases from the same domain (Carbonnell and Lenat, 1986).   
 
The Learning Model 
Case-Based Learning is defined as a process of retaining the new 
solution or the new problem solving plan into the Case Memory for later 
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retrieval and use. The learning process is not a simply memory storage process, 
it involves several types of learning tasks: (1) the selecting task concerns the 
type, form and structure of the new case information to be retained in the Case 
Base; (2) the indexing task concerns the way of using case similarity and features for 
identification and retrieval, (3) the integration of new cases in the Case Base 
structure. 
The CBR learning can be described as a three-step process (Aamodt, 1991): 
1
st
 step:  extract the past case(s) which provide for the learning source, 
2
nd
 step:  construct new knowledge structures, and 
3
rd
 step:   store and index the new case in the Case Memory. 
Case-Based Learning concerns three major areas. The first regards concept 
learning, which aims at learning new abstract concept from exemplars 
provided by past cases, from instances of the same concept provided by the past 
cases or from combined general domain knowledge and domain specific 
knowledge. The basic idea for this learning area is provided by the theories 
concerning concept formation from extensional concept descriptions developed 
by Wittgenstein. These theories allow the use of a set of instances of some 
concept provided by several particular cases for the concept learning purposes. 
The idea has been extensivelly used in Machine Learning.  
The second regards problem solving, which aims at learning the 
problems solving plans or the solutions to new cases using the past cases. 
The third regards decision making learning which aims at learning the 
rational decision structure (goal, alternatives, choice rules) and operational 
architecture. 
Case-Based Reasoning Model has appeared as a very interesting research 
paradigm in Artificial Intelligence due to its capacity of building up solutions to 
problem solving tasks in terms of explanations. These explanations are 
constructs based on the inference rules and mechanisms used by the CBR 
Model and on the general domain knowledge and the cognitive model which 
underline a particular CBR approach. 
As a learning paradigm, explanation-based learning concerns the learning 
process of a problem solving task using an example of a solved problem as a 
problem solving method of a new unsolved problem. It is basically an analytic 
learning method and requires one example in order to learn a problem solving 
method for anjy other similar problem. For this reason, it has been approached 
as a fundamental issue in the research area of CBR. Explanation-based learning 
is a foundational paradigm of the Machine Learning science and it has been 
created as a means of making artefacts able to learn as humans do. From this 
perspective, a CBR Model which uses Explanation-Based Generalisation and 
Learning represents a necessary condition for concept construction and learning 
in areas where only scarce experiential knowledge is available. 
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4. Knowledge Extraction: The Meeting of the CBR’s Dynamical 
Memory Utopia with the Web Technology  
 
Classical CBR, as it was first created by Roger Schank, has been inspired 
by the way humans think and remember. Its initial target – the automated 
learning and problem solving systems – was designed to replicate the human 
thought and to achieve the performances of the human reasoning. On the long 
term, this was an wining idea, but the concrete way to implement it at that time 
had faced too hard a calculus complexity problem than the computational 
memory technologies and AI itself were prepared to approach.  
CBR‟s most prominent achievement was the idea of imitating human 
memory and reminding mechanisms in an artificial operational Dynamic 
Memory system. The Dynamic Memory was nevertheless its major limitation, 
since the AI implementation based on scripts and frames – the most advanced 
knowledge structures at that time – have not succeeded to increase the 
computational performances of this beautiful idea. On the contrary, the 
Dynamic Memory worked as a bumerang and hit back its own AI paradigmatic 
system. For several decades afterwards, both Artificial Intelligence (AI) and 
Machine Learning (ML) had kept this idea as a lost war still bleeding wound 
and faught rather tacitly the dynamic memory failure gost until an unexpected, 
aparently irrelevant for AI, idea had arose: the web as a huge storage of easy-
retrieval information. Meeting it had turned into a true change of destiny, at 
least for CBR and its dynamic memory problem, if not for AI itself. 
The web is a simple idea, but always the simple ideas have succeeded to 
move the world small steps forward. It has a simple mechanism to link one piece of 
information to another in, at least theoretically, endless chains within a huge, say 
“hyper”, multidimensional space of information. The link is bidirectional – it 
works both forward and backward on each connection – and, moreover, each 
piece of information can be linked to, theoretically, infinitely many others. 
Following each alternative chaining would mean to get several different 
perspectives to, eventually, the same “bag” of information. Going one step 
further with this piece of simple reasoning, understanding and interpreting this 
information, depending on what one chaining or another have provided at first 
glance, would result in as many “stories” as the semantics of one such “bag” of 
information can support. But this needs a human mind to make both the 
understanding and the interpretation, since computers are not able to 
understand this knowledge, while humans are quite lazy and unpatient at analyzing 
– piece by piece, chain by chain – huge, barren, apparently irrelevant amounts of 
information.  
The idea basically resembles the old, almost defeated (technologically 
speaking), idea of the dynamic memory. Schank himself finally understood this 
fascinating similarity, but meanwhile many others did. A new true dynamic 
memory idea was born. And it makes possible revisiting CBR.  
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One might ask why “revisiting” and not trying something really new? – The 
true answer is that CBR was, undoubtedly, forgotten or just left aside for a 
while, but it has never been exhausted as a potential cognitive resource and as a 
computational philosophy, and this seems to be the reason why we witness its 
revival from time to time.  
The idea of making CBR and web meet was not advocated by neither of 
them. It was a rather commercial impulse which moved things towards making 
them joining: How to discover and extract the potential knowledge likely to be 
provided by the information in the old databases which have been abandoned 
world wide as soon as the new web technologies offered a huge information 
storage space and easy information retrieval services ? The Knowledge and 
Data Discovery (KDD) scientific area has been created exactly for this purpose. 
But it served much more.  
Developed as an intelligent knowledge engineering technique around mid 
90‟s, the KDD made possible the analysis of huge heterogeneous collections of 
data, left in the commercial and institutional databases all over the world. The 
approach on discovering regularity patterns and significant relationships in 
these data collections has oriented these researches towards the construction of 
large knowledge bases on the web. Original KDD has developed afterwards 
into a class of knowledge extraction researches and advanced technologies: 
information extraction, extraction of relational knowledge from the web, text 
classification, construction of world wide web knowledge bases, text data 
mining, web data mining, data mining on symbolic knowledge extracted from 
the web, to name but a few. 
Each of these research areas are systematically developed approaches on 
knowledge extractors aimed at making the  
 
“computer-retrievable information intended for human consumption a data source 
in computer-understandable form [...which means] to have computers not only gather and 
represent knowledge existing on the Web, but also to use that knowledge for planning, 
acting, and creating new knowledge “2 
A web knowledge base in a computer-understandable form which mirrors 
the contents of the WWW is created by a  knowledge extractor. There are 
various types of  knowledge extractors: feature extractors like hand-written 
wrappers, learned information extractors, text feature extractors, text classifiers 
and extractors of learned relations (Craven et al., 1998).  
A knowledge extractor is organized as a generative mechanism: it is 
initially designed or trained to recognize and classify a given type of web items. 
It is then let work  as a „recognition-selection-and-collect“ engine on the web. 
                                                          
2  GHANI, R., JONES, R., MLADENIC, D., NIGAM, K., SLATTERY, S., Data Mining on 
Symbolic Knowledge Extracted from the Web, 2000.  
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The outcome of a knowledge base generative mechanism is a conceptual 
construct which emerges as the knowledge base grows up: it is usually an 
automatically generated, populated and maintained topical taxonomy. Such 
topical taxonomies or descriptive hierarchies are used to provide for multiple 
set of indexes which provide the support for learning in ill-structured domains 
and constructivism (Nigam, 2001; Schmidt, 2004). Perhaps the best example of 
a generative mechanism in text classification is the parametric generative model 
for dependencies between web text documents and their corresponding web 
class labels. This generative model is trained with unlabeled document 
examples easily extracted from the web and then used for text classification 
tasks involving online data sources, such as web pages and email. The model is 
actually a statistical process which encodes which words are encountered more 
frequently in one class than another and which then use this information to  
create new web labeled documents (Nigam, 2001).  
Though KDD has represented a powerful conceptual and technological 
change within the Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Knowledge 
Engineering – the CBR paradigm keeps being what we use to call a “scientific 
challenge”: while the knowledge representation, search and retrieval problems 
in classical CBR have found in the KDD techniques some excellent solutions, 
the CBR still remains an open problem. KDD has provided different means for 
knowledge discovering in databases on the web, but KDD alone cannot fully 
provide for the explanation and creative explanation-based hypotheses 
development for problem solving tasks of new and atypically cases.  
From a philosophy of science point of view, the major KDD‟s merit is 
that it has induced to the modern Artificial Intelligence the necessity of revisiting its 
own conceptual history very much like people do when they start building up a 
new house using the bricks of the old house. What does CBR gain from revisiting 
its own history? – The actual gain is two folded: it realizes in the first place that it 
still is an open problem, surviving due to its best ideas, and, secondly, it 
realizes that its limitations are not just technical, but theoretical too. The 
theoretical limitations reside in the perspective over the role of the dynamic 
memory. 
The CBR‟s Dynamical Memory initially worked on the principle that any 
automated learning and problem solving system needs a memory of its own as a 
place to store, re-organize and construct new knowledge. From this point of view, 
the Dynamic Memory in CBR system works as a resource which makes possible 
the storage and retrieval of past experience. The better the resource, the better the 
system‟s performances. The larger the contents of the resource, the higher the 
cognitive capacity of the system. The difficulty comes from indexing the past 
experience in such a way that it can be not only easily retrieved, but retreived on 
multiple search keys, thus providing an automated reasoner (an inference engine) with 
multiple potential inference chains and cognitive flexibility. The classical CBR‟s 
dynamic memory failed to approach this aspects for large memories and 
multiple indexing levels. 
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A CBR system which would use the web as an extrinsec dynamic memory or 
implement a web-like dynamic memory, works on a different principle: a flexible 
dynamic web-like memory works as a generative mechanism for constructing 
new knowledge. The CBR‟s dynamic memory system would therefore work as 
a conceptual constructor and not as a “search-and-retrieve” servant. 
The difference between these two perspectives over the role of the 
dynamic memory is fundamental since it transforms the CBR paradigm from a 
model-theoretic paradigm into a constructivist paradigm based on cognitive 
generative mechanisms. This paradigmatic shift subsequently supports an 
epistemological shift since the generative mechanisms are likely to become the 
essential attribute of the artificial societies if these are expected to replicate the 
key issue of the human societies and to be thus used as highly cognitive 
instruments for investigating complex emerging societal phenomena. 
As far as the KDD and data mining technologies involves learning and 
knowledge extraction from text, the research on political terrorism has been 
offered the chance of extracting specific knowledge from web text using 
knowledge extractors and case-based reasoning modeling (Kass, 1990, 1991; 
Riloff and Lehnert, 1884; Cardie, 1999; Schmidt, 2004).  
As an example, the original terrorist scenarios used by Kass to develop a 
framework of creative hypotheses – the Pan Am and the Suicide Bomber 
scenarios – have been used as a basis for knowledge extraction from the web 
and for web text classification. 
 
The Original Pan Am Scenario (Kass, 1991) 
 
„The Pan Am flight 103 exploded in mid air over Lockerbie, Scotland, on 
December 21st, 1988, killing all aboard. It was en route to NYC from Frankfurt, Germany, 
via London, Great Britain” (Kass, 1991). 
 
The Original Suicide Bomber Scenario (Kass, 1991) 
 
„a teenage girl exploded a car bomb at a joint point of israeli troops and pro-
israeli militiamen in southern Lebanon.  The bomber and a number of israeli soldiers were 
killed by the blast” (Kass, 1991). 
 
Kass analysed a set of five sample anomalies and associated explanations
3
. In 
particular, of a special interest for our approach, the Pan Am and the Suicide 
Bomber stories are good examples of how the XP technique can provide a creative 
explanation by adapting the explanations found in the Terrorist Bombing XP: the 
adaptation by means of creative use of the past experience explanation-based 
structures in order to explain new cases. Each of the original scenarios and the 
                                                          
3  KASS, A. M., Question Asking, Artificial Intelligence, and Human Creativity, Technical 
Report #11, Institute for the Learning Sciences, Northwestern University, U.S.A., 1991, pp. 18-19. 
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explaining schema can be mapped onto one or all of the new terrorist scenarios 
we would like to get from the web knowledge extractor and approach with CBR. 
 
 
5. The Generative Mechanism-Based vs. Case-Based Modeling 
 
The power of the generative mechanisms, no matter at what level are 
they used in the architecture of an artificial system – be it an artificial actor or an 
artificial world – resides in their capacity to explain emergence and complexity – 
two key attributes of the real complex systems like those concerning the human 
living, belief, attitude, free will, history, society, and civilisation. If these issues 
are to be computationally modeled, then a generative mechanism is the best 
way to buildup realistic models. 
The generative mechanisms have been intensively used initially within 
the Arificial Life research areas and then extended to the Social Simulation 
domains and recently to Political Science domain and to whatever subdomain 
of these sciences which might be concerned with the processes underlying the 
emergence of new, unknown or unexpected forms of life and societal 
phenomena.  
The generative mechanism is a computational modeling and simulation 
method to:  
(1)  automatically generate research data with the help of artificial worlds 
(societies) in order to study potential emergent phenomena, (Social 
Simulation),  
(2)  automatically construct topic hierarchies and taxonomies with the 
help of knowledge extractors, classifiers and constructors in order to support 
conceptual constructivism, (KDD and Web knowledge technologies),  
(3)  automatically create artificial agents and agenthood in order to study 
society and social life emergence, (Artificial Autonomous Agent research 
areas), and least but not last,  
(4)  automatically generate normative social scenarios and agent societies 
in order to study societal issues like reputation, social action, collective misbelief, 
ethnic conflicts, emergence of new geopolitical powers and international 
relations, (Social and Political Sciences, see (Conte, 1996; Conte and 
Castelfranchi, 1995). 
Note that the researches based on generative mechanisms are mainly in 
the area of the artificial life and artificial society and only scarcely in the area 
of simulation with cognitive agents and of conceptual thinking. This 
observation is relevant if we are to understand the worth of revisiting CBR.  
A generative mechanism is just a research tool if the application keeps 
the human expert in the role of the reasoner. Thus the human expert would be 
the only one able to transform the simulation outcomes into explanations and 
able to reason with this background knowledge.  
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Now, if an application based on a generative mechanism uses an 
automated reasoner which takes on the reasoning role of the human expert, then 
the generative mechanism itself becomes the “living kernel” of an artificially 
generated world or society. A CBR system which would make its knowledge 
base computer-understandable would support a variety of intelligent 
knowledge-based agents. Today social simulations are mainly based on agents 
which are not cognitive agents. In simulations using cellular automata, they are 
simple cells in a grid and have no knowledge and no reasoning capacity with 
respect to the societal scenarios in which they are involved by the simulation 
generative mechanisms. It is the case of the ongoing Social Simulation 
researches which are facing a challenging debate on this epistemological issue. 
This observation is only meant to highlight the perspective that social 
simulations based on agents which are able to know, understand and reason 
would provide for different results and validation issues. Currently used social 
simulation agents have such a simple design that nobody can guarantee if the 
simulation results are a true side-effect of the generative mechanism or a 
random outcome of the computational resources used to program and operate 
these agents. The epistemological debate is unavoidable under the given 
circumstances, though a cognitive agent literature has been developed during 
the past half of a century, but unfortunately ignored by the ongoing social 
simulation researches. 
We are not going to fall into the old dilemma of the worth of getting an 
artificial mind competing with a human mind, since this is not our purpose 
here.  We would just like to note that evaluating the research results provided 
by the systems based on generative mechanisms is not a matter of evaluation in 
terms of “advantage-disadvantage”, which obviously can be done at a certain point. 
It is in the first place a matter of evaluation in terms of what exactly is generated? – 
A gain improving method? An would-be world? An ontology? An 
epistemology?  
If we are to evaluate what has been generated then we are able to make a 
distinction between the worth of revisiting CBR and the worth of doing the 
same thing with the current Agent-Based Computational Modeling paradigm 
used in the ongoing Social Simulation researches. Actually this is the question 
to which this paper is trying to give an answer. And the answer is:  
Revisiting CBR would allow a new generative paradigm to be developed, 
aimed at providing the framework for conceptual construction in ill-structured 
domains.  
The Agent-Based Models use artificial life generative mechanisms and 
the simulation outcome of such a computational modeling would be an 
artificial society whose attributes are still to be understood since the generative 
mechanisms is not based on cognitive agents: these agents are not able to know 
while they are involved in a simulation generative mechanism. The cognitive 
issue and the knowledge is still an attribute of the human expert who is finally 
analyzing the results, but the simulations did not take into account during their 
execution any of the knowledge the human experts is able to extract from the 
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simulation analysis. The debate is generated by the fact that the human expert 
knows only and knows all, while the agents involved in a generative mechanism 
know not and know nothing while simulating a dynamically evolving scenario. 
 
 
6. The Agent-Based vs. Case-Based Computational Modeling and 
Simulation 
 
One theoretical issue which made CBR survive and value is the quest of 
explanation.  Learning and reasoning by (creatively) explaining things is one of 
the most fundamental issues of human intelligence and one of the major proofs 
in the artificial intelligence. The answer to this quest did not come from 
Computer Science, as expected, and not even from the Artificial Intelligence, as 
it should, but from the Social Sciences: Computational Agent-Based Modeling.  
The Agent-Based Computational Modeling and Simulation in Social 
Sciences is what Nigel Gilbert called  
 
“... not just a new method to add to the social researcher's armoury, but a new way 
of thinking about society, and especially social processes [...] The simulation would thus 
have to model both the emergence of societal level properties from individual actions and 
the effect of societal level properties on individual actions. [...] One of the present-day 
challenges for simulation in the social sciences is to develop convincing examples of such 
models”4 
Agent-Based Models – as they have been conceived by the computational 
research in social sciences – are less devoted to the aim at providing heuristics 
and explanations in the model-theoretical top-down style (Axtell, 1997b; 
Gilbert, 1995) using classical inductive or deductive methods (Axelrod, 1997b). 
They are bottom-up approaches aimed at the understanding of the complex 
social processes in terms of artefact constructs able to replicate at both 
individual and societal level a class of phenomena in a virtual environment 
which is similar to the real environment in many respects. Following the 
retroductive principles of the scientific realism (Miller, 1987), the main goal of 
this computational modeling paradigm is to extract the generative mechanisms 
of the emergent phenomena by setting up at the micro level an artificial 
construct which can be grown up such that it can provide for the emergence of 
certain patterns of the complex processes at the macro level (Epstein, 1999).  
The social micro-macro link generative mechanisms are actually computational 
constructs of parameter values and environmental contextual configurations of 
micro elements (individuals, relations between individuals, relations between 
                                                          
4  GILBERT, N., Simulation: an emergent perspective, text of a lecture first given at the 
conference on New Technologies in the Social Sciences, 27-29th October, 1995, Bournemouth, 
UK and then at LAFORIA, Paris, 22nd January 1996.  
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individuals and groups, norms, etc.) which are let to evolve in conditions which are 
similar to the reality. The construct is aimed at explicitly setup a virtual replication of 
some phenomenon and at aggregating the underlying processes which are assumed 
to support this phenomenon in reality. The conditions and configurations of elements 
are themselves selected and their parameters values are setup by experts in social 
sciences whose high-level expertise can guarantee the validity of the selection. The 
simulation outcomes of these evolutive constructs are used as hypotheses on the 
nature and potential evolution of the real micro-macro links at the social level. The 
data provided by the simulation consists in the values of the modified parameters 
and the regularity patterns and significant relationships discovered in this data. The 
data is analyzed again by the experts who use their knowledge and past experience 
to evaluate the “realism” and the scientific validity of the presumed social phenomena. 
The human experts may eventualy get an understanding of the evolution of this 
artefact constructs and associate it with patterns of real phenomena and their 
contingent evolutions. Experts‟ understanding may thus finally become expert 
knowledge and used to hypothetically explain emergent complex phenomena. 
There is a special class of Agent-Based Models: Case-Based Models. 
Case-Based Models are one of the three categories of Agent-Based Models 
found by Boero and Squazzoni in their study on methodological issues on ABM 
for analytical social sciences: case-based models, typifications and theoretical 
abstractions (Boero and Squazzoni, 2005). Though it looks like we should 
actually be interested in the Case-Based Models as an equivalent for the 
classical AI Case-Based Reasoning Models, Boero and Squazzoni‟s study 
shows that things should be taken rather as distinct non-equivalent categories. 
The Case-Based Model is defined by Boero and Squazzoni as an 
 
 “...  ad hoc construct made by the model maker with respect to a target [which] is 
a specific empirical phenomenon with a circumscribed space-time nature”5 
 
As such, a Case-Based Model is what Max Weber called a “historical individual”6 and  
 
“it would allow ... explaining the specificity of the case, and sometimes to build 
upon it realistic scenarios”7  
Rather than achieving generality as it usually happens in the CBR 
Models, such Case-Based Models would help at “appreciating complexity”8. They 
                                                          
5  BOERO and SQUAZZONI, „Does Empirical Embeddedness Matter? Methodological 
Issues on Agent-Based Models for Analytical Social Science”, JASSS, 8, 4, 2005.  
6  MAX WEBER, Objectivity of Social Science and Social Policy (1904), in SHILS, E., 
FINCH, H. (eds.),  The Methodology of Social Sciences, Free Press, NY, 1949. 
7  BOERO and SQUAZZONI, op. cit.  
8  RAGIN, C.C., The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative 
Strategies, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. 
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would provide for a means to achieve generality only if they can be related to a 
typification in the sense this is defined in the Boero and Squazzoni‟s study:  
 
“As Weber argues (1904), the relevance of a case-based model, as well as the condition of 
its possibility, depends on its relation with a theoretical typification [...]   Typifications 
are theoretical constructs intended to investigate some properties that apply to a wide 
range of empirical phenomena that share some common features. They are heuristic 
models that allow understanding some mechanisms that operate within a specific class of 
empirical phenomena [...] cases are nothing but a synonymous for instances of a broader 
class. The selection can be done just under empirical and theoretical prior knowledge and 
following some theoretical hypotheses.  This is why typifications models can be useful.”9 
 
We could understand that isolating empirical phenomena and simulating 
them as Case-Based Models might provide the means to generalize specific aspects of 
those phenomena if some reference to a theoretical defined typed could be used or if 
the simulation results could be compared with previous classifications of those 
phenomena. Things look very much similar with the classical Case-Based Reasoning 
where arbitrary cases (MOPs) are generalized to a Generalized Episode (GE) 
(Schank, 1982) and retrieval of further cases which might fall within the same class 
could only “reinforce the generality level of the Generalized Episode” 
(Aamodt, 1991). When a Case-Based Model‟s outcomes and/or conclusions (in 
the Boero and Squazzoni‟sense) are theoretically validated by one or more 
abstractions (in the same sense), then the Case-Based Model may be 
appreciated as an ultimate instance of the general social reality described by the 
theoretical abstractions:  
“[...] if case-based models are „veridicality‟-based models, aiming at reaching 
accuracy and empirical descriptions, theoretical abstractions are „transparency‟-based 
models aiming at reaching simplicity and generalization.”10 
 
This continuum of the three possible stages of a “carefully selected” 
case-based model suggests that the Case-Based Models could be used for the 
general purposes of case-based reasoning and learning under the constraint that 
there is a previously defined validating domain theory (or theoretical model) to 
which any reference has the value of a theory proof. 
King, Verba and Keohane support this conclusion by making a distinct 
difference between the statistical inference tools (heavily used in analytical 
social sciences for almost a century in generalising empirical cases) and the 
methods of scientific inference based on analogy:  
“... one of the traditional ways of generalising empirical case studies is to use 
methods of scientific inference also to study systematic patterns in similar parallel events 
[...] This is what is done in statistical research: generalising from the sample to the 
                                                          
9  BOERO and SQUAZZONI, op. cit.  
10  Ibid.  
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universe, trying to test the significance of particular findings with respect to the universe.  
But empirical case studies profoundly differ from statistical surveys.”11 
 
Following the epistemological reference framework elaborated by Becker, 
Niehaves and Klose (2005), we could distinguish an essential diference between the 
AI CBR models and the Social Simulation Case-Based models: while the classical 
CBR is an empirical, inductive paradigm, the CBM is a kantian, deductive paradigm: 
 
“Models are used as the core of the method, to - at least partly - representing 
and/or aiming at a "real world" object system or problem. In fact, here, models are used in 
two ways. At first, researchers try to identify universal principles and processes of the 
"real world" which they formalize in the forms of models. Afterwards, the models derived, 
are in turn used within the simulation process in order to receive new cognitions. 
Obviously, the construction of the simulation model is a fundamental step for the validity 
of the simulation results.”12 
 
This interesting parallel between the CBR revisited paradigm and the 
Agent Case-Based Modeling paradigm highlights their resemblance in many 
respects. Their resemblance is provided by the fact that both of them use 
particular past experience in order to acquire more general classification and 
problem solving experience.  
Beyond this resemblance (which is important and relevant up to a certain 
point), there is however a fundamental difference at the level of their generative 
mechanisms: while the generative mechanisms in the AI CBR are meant to 
support the conceptual constructivism, the generative mechanisms in the Social 
Simulation Case-Based Models are meant to support the structural complexity 
constructivism. The models which could be generated even from single cases 
(case-based models) are viewed as 
 
 “generative tools, because they allow formalising a representation of the micro-
macro mechanisms responsible for social outcomes to be brought about”13  
 
Their specific purposes are targeting constructivism obstinately, but at 
different levels, in different ways and with different theoretical implications. 
The former builds up abstract conceptual knowledge and use it in a top-down 
manner in order to provide for explanations, while the later builds up an 
artefact construct and use it in a bottom-up manner to provide for explanations.  
                                                          
11  KING, G., VERBA, S., and KEOHANE, R.O., Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton Univ. Press, 1994. 
12  BECKER, J., NIEHAVES, B., and KLOSE, K., „A Framework for Epistemological 
Perspectives on Simulation”, in Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 8, 4, 2005. 
13  HEDSTRÖM, P. and SWEDBERG, R. (eds.), Social mechanisms: An Analytical 
Approach to Social Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
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This comparative perspective does show that beyond resemblance and 
discrepance between these two paradigms, there is a basic complementarity 
between them. Their fundamental attributes provide for a necessary and, in 
some sense, expected paradigmatic complementarity. The necessity follows 
from their both supporting constructivism at complementary levels: the 
structural level and the conceptual level. The expectedness follows from both of 
them building up on contingent knowledge and reaching a generalized 
knowledge level. We might say that each of them is a oneway ticket to 
achieving an integrated computational modeling and simulation framework in 
ill-structured domains: just that one if for the way to (the bottom-up way), and 
the other is for the way back (the top-down way). 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Case Based Reasoning and Modeling is a classical Artificial Intelligence 
paradigm for learning and problem solving in ill-structured domains. This 
research framework is particulary useful for ill-structured domains which have 
weak domain theories or which have only scarce ill-structured typical 
knowledge. The AI Case-Based Reasoning paradigm provides the appropriate 
support for constructivism and advanced learning in political analysis.  
Political Terrorism is characterized by an ill-structured domain theory. 
For almost 15 years, the Case-Based Reasoning and Modeling paradigm has 
been employed in researches on political terrorism: data mining and web text 
classification or constructivist frameworks concerning explanative hypotheses. 
This powerful computational modeling paradigm has provided the conceptual 
support for advances in the direction of conceptual constructivism in the 
analysis and modeling of the terrorism phenomena.  
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